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The matching method for treatment evaluation does not balance selective unobserved 
differences between treated and non-treated. We derive a simple correction term if there is 
an instrument that shifts the treatment probability to zero in specific cases. Policies with 
eligibility restrictions, where treatment is impossible if some variable exceeds a certain value, 
provide a natural application. In an empirical analysis, we first examine the performance of 
matching versus regression-discontinuity estimation in the sharp age-discontinuity design of 
the NDYP job search assistance program for young unemployed in the UK. Next, we exploit 
the age eligibility restriction in the Swedish Youth Practice subsidized work program for 
young unemployed, where compliance is imperfect among the young. Adjusting the matching 
estimator for selectivity changes the results towards ineffectiveness of subsidized work in 
moving individuals into employment. 
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The matching method for treatment evaluation compares outcomes of treated and
non-treated subjects, conditioning on observed characteristics of the subjects and
their environment. Basically, the average treatment e®ect on the treated (ATT) is
estimated by averaging observed outcome di®erences over the treated. The main
assumption is that the conditioning ensures that the assigned treatment status is
conditionally mean independent from the potential outcomes (\the Conditional
Independence Assumption" or CIA).1
The method is intuitive, as it mimics randomized experiments: the distribu-
tions of behavioral determinants and indicators are balanced as closely as possible
over treated and non-treated, using observational data. The use of the method
has improved the policy evaluation practice by clarifying the importance of com-
mon support restrictions for the distribution of conditioning variables. By now,
it is a common tool for the analysis of active labor market policies (ALMP) and
programs (see e.g. the survey in Kluve, 2006).
A well-recognized limitation of matching is that it does not ensure the bal-
ancing of the distributions of unobserved determinants of treatment assignment
among treated and non-treated. If the assigned treatment as well as the poten-
tial outcomes are a®ected by unobserved characteristics, and if these are not fully
explained by the set of conditioning variables, the matching may give biased re-
sults. This is a potentially serious concern in the case of the evaluation of ALMP
for unemployed workers. Observed individual characteristics and past individual
labor market outcomes may not fully capture individual's motivation and social
skills, and the latter may a®ect both the case workers' treatment assignment and
the unemployed individuals' job prospects.2
The ¯rst contribution of this paper is to derive a simple adjustment or correc-
tion term for the matching estimator for the case where treated and non-treated
are systematically di®erent in unobserved characteristics a®ecting the potential
outcomes. Key to this is the existence of an instrumental variable that a®ects
the treatment decision but not outcome. In particular, the variable is required
to shift the treatment probability to zero for a speci¯c (limiting) value of the
1See e.g. Cochrane and Rubin (1973), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1998).
2For example, Card and Sullivan (1988), Gritz (1993), Bonnal, Fougµ ere and S¶ erandon (1997)
and Richardson and Van den Berg (2001) argue that this can be expected to play a major role
in the empirical evaluation of ALMP, and their estimation results con¯rm this. Van den Berg,
Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) contain similar ¯ndings for the e®ect of punitive sanctions
for welfare recipients.
2variable. This allows for estimation of the mean outcome among controls that
is free from any selection problem, which in turn allows for estimation of the
counterfactual mean outcome without treatment among those who are actually
treated. The correction term for selectivity is zero in case of conditional mean
independence, and this applies if the value of the instrument is observed not to
covary with the outcome among non-treated individuals.3 With the instrument,
we can thus test whether the matching method is appropriate (i.e., whether the
CIA is satis¯ed).
The method is particularly useful if the policy design contains an eligibility
boundary restriction in the sense that treatment is impossible if some observed
variable or characteristic exceeds a certain threshold value, while individuals are
eligible for the treatment on the other side of the threshold value but they are
sometimes not treated. In other words, individuals whose characteristic exceeds a
certain threshold value are not eligible, and this is strictly enforced, and individ-
uals whose characteristic is below the threshold are eligible, but their compliance
is imperfect. Here, the word \compliance" is used in a statistical sense, meaning
that individuals who according to the policy design are eligible for treatment end
up in the non-treated subpopulation. This is a relevant setting. It is a common
feature of ALMP that they restrict eligibility to individuals aged above or be-
low a certain age, and/or to individuals with a certain minimum or maximum
amount of education, and/or to individuals with a certain minimum amount of
labor market experience (see e.g. Kluve, 2006). If imperfect compliance among
the eligible individuals is selective then the matching approach cannot be used.
Our approach overcomes this limitation, by exploiting the eligibility boundary re-
striction within the matching framework. We should emphasize that our method
does not require the restriction to be a discontinuity. Note that it is well-known
that regression discontinuity with imperfect compliance allows for inference of
local average treatment e®ects (see e.g. Angrist and Imbens, 1991, and Bat-
tistin and Rettore, 2007). See Van der Klaauw (2008) for a lucid overview of
regression-discontinuity inference with imperfect compliance.
We empirically assess our approach by evaluating two major ALMP aimed
at helping unemployed individuals aged below 25 to ¯nd work.4 First of all, we
3Alternative approaches in order to correct matching estimators for selection problems typ-
ically assume that the relevant unobserved variables have additive e®ects on the potential
outcomes (see Heckman and Robb, 1985, and Andrews and Schafgans, 1998). The popular
conditional di®erence-in-di®erences estimator (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998) is
also based on this. By contrast, our approach does not require additivity.
4There is an increasing awareness that youth unemployment may be a serious problem for
society despite the fact that youth unemployment durations are relatively short. This is because
3estimate the average e®ect of participation in the New Deal for Young People
(NDYP) program for young unemployed in the UK on the individual probabil-
ity of ¯nding work. Participants enter the program upon reaching 6 months of
unemployment. From that moment until 4 months later, they receive intensive
job search assistance. The program provides a sharp age-discontinuity design in
that participation is compulsory for, and restricted to, those aged below 25 upon
reaching 6 months of unemployment. As such, the inference method that we de-
velop in this paper can not be applied here. Nevertheless, we feel that the NDYP
analysis is relevant because it allows us to assess the performance of matching
in a setting where it should correctly estimate the ATT (for an appropriate sub-
population). For the usefulness of our method, it seems reasonable to demand
that matching performs well in a sharp discontinuity design. This evaluation
can be seen as a non-experimental counterpart of LaLonde (1986)' s validation
study with experimental data. When we use matching then we obviously do not
include age in the set of explanatory variables in the NDYP propensity score.
As such, we examine whether matching is able to capture the NDYP assignment
process that in reality is only driven by age at 6 months of unemployment. We
should emphasize that, in general, if the CIA is valid, matching estimators and
regression-discontinuity estimators do not necessarily estimate the same average
e®ect. Speci¯cally, the latter estimates a local e®ect for the subpopulation of
individuals close to the eligibility threshold, whereas the former may estimate a
more global ATT e®ect for all treated. To prevent a misalignment of subpopu-
lations, we restrict attention in all analyses to individuals close to the eligibility
threshold. In order to detect secular e®ects of age, we repeat the analyses at
integer age changes within the set of eligible individuals. A di®erential e®ect for
e.g. those aged 23.99 and those aged 24.01 should be taken into account when
exploiting the eligibility threshold at age 25.
Next, in our second empirical evaluation, we estimate the average employment
e®ect of participation in the Swedish Youth Practice subsidized work program for
young unemployed. This program is designed for short-term unemployed indi-
viduals aged below 25. Although the program was designed to be compulsory, in
practice, many of those below 25 do not participate. This means that compliance
is imperfect on the lower side of the age-eligibility threshold. We may therefore
apply our selectivity-adjusted matching estimator. The subpopulation of non-
treated includes those below 25 who do not participate as well as those above 25.
In fact, participation is not sharply discontinuous at age 25 but declines shortly
of the prevalence of psychological and labor-market scarring e®ects which may have long-run
implications for the productivity of those a®ected (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2003).
4before age 25. This is not a problem for our method but would complicate the
use of regression-discontinuity methods.
Both the British NDYP and the Swedish YP have been evaluated before, in
a range of studies (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2004, De Giorgi, 2005, Larsson, 2003,
and Forslund and NordstrÄ om Skans, 2006, for results and overviews of results).5
It is of particular interest that the YP evaluations are based on the matching
approach and that we ¯nd that adjusting the matching estimator for selectivity
changes the results towards ine®ectiveness of YP.
In Section 2 we develop a formal framework for the analysis. We de¯ne the
objects of interest and we derive the selectivity-adjusted matching estimator.
In Sections 3 and 4 we evaluate the British NDYP program and the Swedish
YP program, respectively. Section 5 discusses our results within the existing
literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Inference
We adopt standard counterfactual notation where Y0 and Y1 are individual coun-
terfactual outcomes associated with being assigned to non-treatment and treat-
ment, respectively. The binary indicator D denotes the actual treatment status.
The vector X contains conditioning variables.
Suppose there exists an instrumental variable Z satisfying the following con-
ditions,
1. Y0 ? Z j X
2. There exists a set of points fz¤;z¤¤g in the domain of Z where P [D = 0 j X;Z = z¤] =
1 and 0 < P [D = 0 j X;Z = z¤¤] < 1.
In this case,
E [Y0 j X] = E [Y0 j X;Z]
= E [Y0 j X;Z;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X;Z] +
E [Y0 j X;Z;D = 1]P [D = 1 j X;Z]
Since this relationship holds for all possible values of Z, and in particular for
Z = z¤, it yields
E [Y0 j X] = E [Y0 j X;Z = z
¤;D = 0]
5See White and Knight (2002), for an explicit descriptive comparison of the NDYP and YP
programs.
5On the other hand,
E [Y0 j X] = E [Y0 j X;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X] +
E [Y0 j X;D = 1]P [D = 1 j X]
which then implies,
E [Y0 j X;D = 1] =
E [Y0 j X] ¡ E [Y0 j X;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X]
P [D = 1 j X]
=
E [Y0 j X;Z = z¤;D = 0] ¡ E [Y0 j X;D = 0]P [D = 0 j X]
P [D = 1 j X]
= E [Y0 j X;D = 0] +
E [Y0 j X;Z = z¤;D = 0] ¡ E [Y0 j X;D = 0]
P [D = 1 j X]
(1)
The matching method assumes the ¯rst term of the right-hand side to be
equal to E (Y0jD = 1;X). Thus, the CIA assumption holds i®
E [Y0 j X;Z = z¤;D = 0] ¡ E [Y0 j X;D = 0]
P [D = 1 j X]
= 0 (2)
Therefore, for as long as there exists an instrument ful¯lling the assumptions
stated above we can test the assumption that the bias term in (2) is zero.6
More in general, our result suggests to use the second term in the right-hand
side of (1) to correct for the selection on unobservables. This is an identi¯cation
result that does not depend on additivity. By averaging the right-hand side of
(1) over the distribution of X given D = 1, over the (\common") support that is
shared with the distribution of X given D = 0, we obtain the ATT. In Section 4
we discuss the actual implementation of the estimator in more detail, using the
example of the Swedish YP program.
Recall from Section 1 that we evaluate two major ALMP. In the ¯rst one,
in the section below, the inference method that we develop in this paper can
not be applied. Nevertheless, the analysis allows us to assess the performance
of matching in a setting where, under the hypothesis that the CIA is valid, it
should correctly estimate the ATT. In particular, it seems reasonable to demand
that matching performs well in a sharp discontinuity design.
6The CIA test proposed in Battistin and Rettore (2007) focuses on the same term as the
bias term in (2) for the special case of a regression-discontinuity design with one-sided imperfect
compliance. Their proposed test is derived in the context of regression-discontinuity inference
of local average treatment e®ects.
63 Evaluation of The New Deal for Young People
3.1 The program
The New Deal is the °agship welfare-to-work program in the UK. It has now
been running for over 9 years, since the beginning of the Labour government.
There are a myriad of New Deal's for di®erent groups and addressing di®erent
employment problems. The largest and ¯rst to be implemented is the New Deal
for the Young People (NDYP). It is targeted at the unemployed of 18 to 24
years of age who have claimed unemployment bene¯ts (Job Seekers Allowance -
JSA) for at least 6 months. Participation is compulsory at reaching 6 months
in the claimant count, where refusal to participate is sanctioned with temporary
withdrawal from bene¯ts.
Treatment is split into three stages. It comprises a ¯rst period of up to 4
months of intensive job search assistance where a personal adviser meets the un-
employed at least fortnightly. This is called the Gateway. For those remaining un-
employed, the NDYP then o®ers the possibility of enrolling into one of four alter-
native options: subsidized employment, full-time education or training, working
on an organization in the voluntary sector and working in an environment-focused
organization. Participation in one of the options is compulsory for individuals
completing 4 months into the NDYP although this does not seem to have been
strictly enforced. The options last up to 6 months except for education, which
can take up to 12 months. The third NDYP stage is a new period of intensive
job-search assistance for those still unemployed after the options. This is called
the Follow Through.7
The NDYP was introduced in January 1998 in Pilot areas and released nation-
wide in April 1998. It has now treated around 1.2 million people, some having
had more then one NDYP spell. 172 thousand new participants enrolled in the
NDYP during 2006 while the average number of participants at any month during
that year was 93 thousand. According to the Department for Work and Pensions
(DWP) statistics, the forecasted expenditure with the NDYP for the 2006-07 tax
year is of GBP 225 million, excluding administrative costs.8 A large proportion of
this is unemployment bene¯ts that would be due independently of the existence
of the program for as long as the individuals remain unemployed. According to
the studies by Layard (2000) and Van Reenen (2004), the NDYP seems to be
7More details on the program can be found in Blundell et al. (2004), Van Reenen (2004),
or Dorsett (2006).
8The tax year is April to March. See DWP (Department for Work and Pensions), 2006, and
the DWP website for recent o±cial statistics on the NDYP.
7cost e®ective as the social bene¯ts exceed the social costs. Past estimates of the
impact of the NDYP suggest that the program raises the chances of unemployed
people ¯nding a job by around 5% after 4 months of enrolling into the NDYP and
this e®ect seems to persist for some time after 4 months. The bene¯ts brought
in by increased chances of employment compare with the modest cost of the
program when net of bene¯t payments, resulting in a net social bene¯t.
3.2 Data
In this application we use the JUVOS longitudinal dataset. This is a random
sample of the administrative data on all JSA claimant spells. It represents 5%
of the British population since 1982. The claimant history is recorded with start
and exit dates and destination on leaving. A small number of demographic vari-
ables is also available, including age, gender, marital status, geographic location,
previous occupation and sought occupation. Agents can be followed through all
their JSA spells as the same group is followed over time, allowing for a detailed
characterization of the unemployment history. However, information about what
happens while o®-bene¯ts is scarce. Destination when leaving is available from
1996 onwards only and we know of no other transitions if they do not involve a
claim of unemployment bene¯ts.9
Estimation uses information on unemployment spells lasting for at least 6
months and starting between July (pilot areas) / October (non-pilot areas) 1997
and December 2003. We use at most one unemployment spell per individual:
the ¯rst long (over 6 months) unemployment spell within our time frame. Since
the participants enrolling into options leave the claimant count, it would be dif-
¯cult to ascertain the eligibility and participation status of individuals in their
second or higher long unemployment spell. Our selected sample includes males
who complete 25 years of age in less than 180 days of being 6 months into the
unemployed spell. The treated (controls) are those aged 24 (25) by the end of 6
months in the claimant count.
Table 1 shows the sample size for treated and controls in each 30 days interval
around the 25th birthday at completion of 6 months into the claimant count.
9In total, there are 842 observations we do not know the destination in our sample of 3503
agents.
8Table 1: Number of observations by age group and treatment status. Age groups
de¯ned by distance to 25th birthday at completion of 6 months in JSA claimant
count. Men only.
Distance to 25th
birthday at 6 treated controls
months into U (under 25) (over 25) Total
6 30 days 241 271 512
31-60 days 283 290 573
61-90 days 322 295 617
91-120 days 300 288 588
121-150 days 293 316 609
151-180 days 312 292 604
Total 1,751 1,752 3,503
3.3 Estimation procedure
The compulsory nature of the NDYP and the age eligibility criterion generate a
sharp discontinuity in participation at the 25th birthday. This creates the ideal
setting to assess the adequacy of the CIA in evaluation using as instrument the
distance in days to the 25th birthday at completion of 6 months in unemployment.
In the evaluation exercise, we consider two alternative outcomes (Y ):
² the re-employment probability 120 days after enrollment, by the end of the
tenth month after becoming a claimant or
² the probability of having left the JSA claimant count 120 days after enroll-
ment, by the end of the tenth month after becoming a claimant.
We compare two alternative estimation methods in trying to identify the
average impact of treatment on the treated (ATT). The ¯rst is the standard
matching on the propensity score. The second is the regression discontinuity
exploring the sharp design in age.
The matching estimates use the whole sampled population of treated/controls
as described above (24 and 25 years old males at less than 180 days of their 25th
birthday on completion of 6 months in the claimant count). The propensity score
is based on all the observed demographic information and a detailed unemploy-
ment history constructed from the historical records in JUVOS. The covariates
9used in matching are marital status, region at 2 digits level (37 regions), usual
occupation at 2 digits level (77 categories), claiming history over the past 3 years
and quarter of in°ow. We also single out region to produce a second set of
estimates based on propensity score matching coupled with exact matching on
region. The matching procedure uses Epanechnikov kernel weights and di®erent
bandwidths have been tried.
Figure 1 plots the pdf of the predicted propensity scores for treated and con-
trols using the full speci¯cation.10 The two distributions overlap for most of
the domain. In the estimation we exclude observations scoring below the maxi-
mum 5 centile and above the minimum 95 centile of the two distributions. This
amounts to considering the central part of the distribution, grossly corresponding
to propensity scores above 0.35 and below 0.65.
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The regression discontinuity estimates explore further the age-cuto® point for
eligibility. We use the same kernel weights as for the matching procedure de-
scribed above. Such weights are then combined with the kernel (Epanechnikov)
weights for the distance to 25th birthday at completion of 6 months in unem-
ployment. As we vary the bandwidth on the distance to the 25th birthday, this
corresponds e®ectively to changing the treatment and control groups. We con-
sider multiples of 30 days for the bandwidth on the distance to the 25th birthday,
from 60 to 180 days.11 We then use local linear regressions (LLR) based on two
linear models, separately for treated and controls, of the outcome of interest on
10Estimates of the propensity score can be found in Table 8 in the Appendix.
11Comparisons using only individuals at less than 30 days of completing 25 at becoming
unemployed for 6 months are very imprecise given the sample size.
10the distance to the 25th birthday at 6 months into the unemployment spell. Es-
timation is by weighted least squares using the weights described above. The
estimated impact is the di®erence between the intercepts in the two regressions,
when the distance to the 25th birthday at 6 months in unemployment is zero.
3.4 Results
We estimate the impact of the NDYP on the two outcomes of interest, namely
exits into all destinations and exits into employment within 120 days of joining
the program.12 Results for the ATT using exact matching on region are displayed
in table 2.
Column 1 in table 2 shows estimates of the impact of treatment on the prob-
ability of leaving the claimant count with 120 days of joining the NDYP and
column 2 presents the respective standard errors. According to the discontinuity
design estimates in rows 1 to 5, the NDYP seems to have had a positive and
sizeable impact on the probability of leaving unemployment and the estimate
becomes larger the closer we get to the cuto® point (25th birthday at in°ow into
the NDYP). The matching estimator also suggests a positive and large impact
on the odds of leaving unemployment but the estimated e®ect is smaller than
any of the estimates obtained using regression discontinuity. A possible explana-
tion for this pattern is that older individuals are more strongly a®ected by the
NDYP. We test the importance of these di®erences in columns 3 and 4. Column
3 presents the di®erence between the regression discontinuity and the matching
estimates. These are systematically positive and monotonically decreasing with
the bandwidth on the distance to the 25th birthday. However, column 4 shows
that none of these di®erences is statistically signi¯cant.
Columns 5 to 8 in Table 2 show a similar pattern when exits into employment
is the outcome of interest. Again, regression-discontinuity estimates are positive
and large, although not as large as the estimates of the impact on the probabilities
of leaving unemployment. The matching estimate is equally positive but smaller
than any of the discontinuity design estimates. This makes the di®erences in
column 7 systematically positive and higher for the older participants, but again
none of these di®erences is statistically signi¯cant.
The evidence in this example does not reject the hypothesis that matching
and discontinuity design are estimating the same parameter. But this may be
12These estimates are based on exact matching on region and a bandwidth of 0.1 for the
matching on the propensity score. Estimates using matching on the propensity score only
and alternative bandwidths show the same patterns and are available from the authors under
request.
11Table 2: ATT: Impact of the NDYP on the odds of leaving unemployment and
¯nding a job within 120 days of completing 6 months in the claimant count
(conditional on having completed 6 months in unemployment); men only
Max dist to 25th btday Exits to all destinations Exits to employment
at 180 days into U est se di®(*) se est se di®(]) se
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Regression discontinuity
(1) § 60 days 0.183* 0.081 0.044 0.078 0.123* 0.075 0.073 0.071
(2) § 90 days 0.180* 0.064 0.040 0.060 0.084* 0.057 0.033 0.053
(3) § 120 days 0.177* 0.053 0.038 0.049 0.064* 0.049 0.013 0.044
(4) § 150 days 0.152* 0.048 0.013 0.043 0.072* 0.040 0.021 0.035
(5) § 180 days 0.143* 0.043 0.004 0.038 0.075* 0.034 0.025 0.029
(6) Simple matching 0.139* 0.020 0.051* 0.018
Notes: The population used in the estimation is de¯ned based on the distance to the 25th birthday on the
day 6 months in JSA are completed. We have considered groups up to 180 days away from their 25th birth-
day. The simple matching estimates on the bottom of the table are based on this group using exact matching
on region and propensity score matching on the other covariates with kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.1.
Regression-discontinuity estimates use LLR on distance to 25th birthday separately on treated and non-treated
using weighted least squares. It then compares the predictions of both regressions at the point where the re-
gressor (distance to 25th birthday) is zero to compute the estimated e®ect. Simple matching di®ers from the
discontinuity design method by not using age information in any more detail than in the de¯nition of the treat-
ment and control groups. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 100 replications.
(]) \di®" in columns (3) and (7) refers to the di®erence between the estimates obtained using regression discon-
tinuity and simple matching. Columns (4) and (8) report the standard errors for the di®erence obtained using
100 bootstrap replications.
* Statistically di®erent from 0 at 5% signi¯cance level.
a consequence of the relatively small sample size and how it a®ects precision,
as the estimates do insinuate that di®erences may exist between the two sets of
estimates. Under the discontinuity design assumptions, such di®erences could
arise through two channels. First and more obvious, the regression-discontinuity
assumptions do not imply the matching assumptions.13 If, in particular, the
conditional independence assumption fails to hold then matching will not identify
13We assume that regression discontinuity is valid under the matching conditional indepen-
dence assumption. This is generally true. To see why, let Z be the instrument (age) and X be
the other covariates used to perform matching, D the treatment status indicator and Y 0 be the
outcome if the agent is not treated. Now suppose that the regression discontinuity assumption
does not hold so that E(Y 0jX;Z) has a discontinuity at the threshold in Z, in this example
the 25th birthday. But Z univocally determines D and so E(Y 0jX;D) will not, in general, be
invariant with D, except maybe for very particular groups where the discontinuity is leveled
out with observations further away from the cuto® point.
12the ATT. And second, the impact of treatment may vary with age, in which
case the eligibility rule e®ectively creates selection on the potential gains. Such
selection does not a®ect the ability of matching to identify the ATT as only
selection on the unobserved part of Y 0 needs to be ruled out. However, selection
on potential gains correlated with the instrument implies that the discontinuity
design will identify a local parameter, namely the impact of treatment on the
treated close to the cuto® point, while matching identi¯es the global impact of
treatment on the treated being considered in the evaluation procedure.
Table 3: Age e®ect: Impact of age on the odds of leaving unemployment and
¯nding a job within 120 days of completing 6 months in the claimant count
(conditional on having completed 6 months in unemployed); men aged 23 and 24
only
Exact matching on region
Exits to all Exits to
Max dist to 24th btday destinations employment
at 180 days into U est se est se
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression discontinuity
(1) § 60 days 0.031 0.057 0.032 0.059
(2) § 90 days 0.012 0.050 0.007 0.046
(3) § 120 days 0.026 0.044 0.020 0.041
(4) § 150 days 0.011 0.038 0.008 0.039
(5) § 180 days -0.002 0.034 -0.006 0.038
(6) Simple matching 0.011 0.016 0.008 0.017
Notes: The population used in the estimation is de¯ned based on the distance to the 24th
birthday on the day 6 months in JSA are completed. We have considered groups up to 180
days away from their 24th birthday. The simple matching estimates on the bottom of the
table are based on this group using exact matching on region and propensity score matching
on the other covariates with kernel weights and a bandwidth of 0.1. Regression-discontinuity
estimates use LLR on distance to 24th birthday separately on 23 and 24 years old using least
squares with matching weights. It then compares the predictions of both regressions at the
point where the regressor (distance to 24th birthday) is zero to compute the estimated e®ect.
Simple matching di®ers from the discontinuity-design method by not using age information
in any more detail than in the de¯nition of the treatment and control groups. Bootstrapped
standard errors based on 100 replications.
To investigate the importance of heterogeneity on the treatment e®ects by
age in our application, we compute the age e®ects using a comparison between
23 and 24 years old males at the enrollment point. Under the matching and
discontinuity design assumptions, any non-zero estimates can only be caused by
13changes in mean gains with age as both groups are to become treated by the
NDYP. Table 3 displays the results. All estimates are small and insigni¯cant,
independently of the outcome of interest (exits to all destinations - columns 1
and 2 - or exits into employment - columns 3 and 4) and the estimation method
(discontinuity design - rows 1 to 5 - or matching - row 6). It is also much less
clear from this table that the e®ects change systematically in the same direction
as we include groups further away from the cuto® point although the estimates
in row 1 are still higher than any of the other estimates. In all, however, this
table o®ers no indication of possible age e®ects.
4 Evaluation of Youth Practice
4.1 The program
Youth Practice (YP) is a Swedish large-scale subsidized-work program targeted
at the 18-24 years old unemployed. This program was launched in July 1992.
In October 1995 it was subsumed into an extended policy program for youth
unemployment. O±cially, eligibility required a minimum unemployment duration
of 4 months for the 20-24 years old and 8 weeks for the 18-19 years old. We
restrict attention to the 20-24 years old because of a range of di®erences with the
policy regime for those below 20 (see Forslund and NordstrÄ om Skans, 2006, and
the other references in Section 1, for details on YP and youth unemployment in
Sweden). Participation was not compulsory. In fact, YP was one among several
non-compulsory treatments that agents could enter. The most relevant other
possible treatment is Labor Market Training, which is an expensive program
that mostly consists of vocational training.
The YP program was primarily intended for individuals with a high school
diploma. Participants were placed in a job in the private or public sector, for 6
months, with a possible extension to 12 months. In fact, eligible individuals were
encouraged to ¯nd such a subsidized job themselves. While at work, participants
received an allowance below the current wage rate. The employer paid at most
a small fraction of the allowance. The job was supposed to be supplementary
in the sense that it should not displace regular employment. The participant
was supposed to spend at least four hours per week at the employment o±ce
to search for more regular employment (the no-displacement and the job-search
requirement seem to have been violated regularly).
Empirical data show that the eligibility requirement concerning the 4-month
minimum unemployment duration was not respected: 28% of participants enter
14within 30 days of starting a new unemployment spell, and 68% enter before com-
pleting 120 days in unemployment. The age eligibility rule, however, is strictly
respected: participants are always below the age of 25 at the moment of enrolling
into YP.
4.2 Data
We use the Swedish unemployment register called HÄ andel. This is an adminis-
trative dataset that comprises information from August 1991 onwards on unem-
ployment spells, program participation spells and the subsequent labor market
status of those who are deregistered (e.g. employment, education, inactivity or
`lost' (attrition)). All individuals with unemployment claiming spells since 1991
are reported in the dataset and their unemployment history can be followed over
time. HÄ andel also includes demographic information on age, gender, citizenship,
area of residence and education.
For the purposes of our evaluation, we use only the ¯rst unemployment spell
starting between July 1992 and September 1995, while YP was o®ered. In the
estimation procedure we explore age as the source of randomization by comparing
two closely aged groups: those aged 24 with those aged 25 at unemployment
in°ow. Our analysis is for men only.
The sample size by eligibility and treatment status for di®erent age groups is
displayed in Table 4. Each individual is represented only once in our sample as
we only consider the ¯rst observed unemployment spell within the July 1992 to
September 1995 time frame.
Column 3 in Table 4 shows that the number of program participants is small
even though we use the whole population of treated as recorded in the admin-
istrative unemployment records. The wide availability of alternative treatments
may explain why the YP has remained a small program while it lasted. Column
3 in Table 4 also shows that participation is more likely among agents starting
unemployment spells further away from their 25th birthday. This is a purely me-
chanical e®ect: younger agents at in°ow into unemployment have more time to
participate while eligibles at the verge of completing 25 years of age at in°ow have
just a few days to enrol into the program. In all cases, however, the proportion
of individuals enrolling into YP is relatively low.
We measure the impact of treatment on the odds of leaving unemployment or
¯nding a job after 6, 12, 18 and 24 months of starting the unemployment spell.
15Table 4: Number of observations by age group eligibility/treatment status; age
groups de¯ned by distance to 25th birthday at in°ow into ¯rst unemployment
spell between July 1992 and October 1995; men only.
ineligibles eligibles (under 25)
Distance to 25th birthday (over 25) non-participants participants Total
at in°ow into U (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) up to 90 days 7,163 6,915 138 14,367
(2) 91-180 days 7,238 6,447 633 14,535
(3) 181-270 days 7,281 6,145 1,109 14,318
(4) 271-360 days 7,252 5,988 1,227 14,216
(5) Total 28,934 25,455 3,107 57,436
Notes: The population is that of males °owing into unemployment between July 1992 and September 1995
while aged 24 or 25 years old. The participants are taking YP within 360 days of °owing into unemployment
without having had another activity (program participation, job or other) since joining the unemployment
register.
4.3 Estimation procedure
Estimation is based on the selected population of males aged 24 or 25 at their
¯rst unemployment spell between July 1992 and September 1995. Eligibility is
assessed based on age at in°ow into unemployment, where those aged 24 are
eligibles and those aged 25 are not.
The treated group is composed of the eligibles who select into YP as their ¯rst
activity after becoming unemployed. We consider alternative treatment groups
depending on two dimensions:
1. duration of unemployment prior to enrollment into the YP: up to 0 (many
individuals °ow straight into YP from employment), 30, 90, 180 and 360
days;
2. and distance in days to 25th birthday at in°ow into unemployment - up to
180 and 360 days.14
The control group is composed of eligibles and ineligibles not enrolling into YP
as their ¯rst activity within the considered time window. The precise de¯nition
14We chose not to tighten this requirement given the small number of treated observations
close to the age cuto® point (see Table 4 and discussion above).
16of control group matches that of the treated group in terms of age and allowed
duration of unemployment prior to enrollment into treatment. Notice that we
do not require controls to be under 25 at in°ow (eligible) as this instrument
is used to test the adequacy of matching. We also do not require controls to
remain unemployed and untreated for the length of time the treated take to enrol
into treatment. This would demand the use of a dynamic framework which has
problems of its own and is outside the scope of this study (see Sianesi, 2004).
The standard matching estimates are produced using propensity score match-
ing with kernel Epanechnikov weights. The propensity score is estimated on all
observable characteristics excluding age, the selected instrument, namely citizen-
ship, education, region of residence, quarter of entry and labor market history in
the two years preceding the start of the unemployment spell.
Estimates of the propensity score when individuals are allowed a whole year
to enrol into treatment can be found in the Appendix, Table 9. Figure 2 plots
the distribution of the predicted scores by treatment and eligibility status for the
same sample.
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Enrollment into treatment seems to be partly dependent on the observable
characteristics but eligibles and ineligibles as de¯ned by age at in°ow are virtually
indistinguishable with respect to the distribution of the propensity score. 15 This
is also true when the treated are excluded for the group of eligibles as they are a
relatively small proportion of this group.
Estimation of the correction term requires two alternative control groups. We
use the control group just de¯ned above plus the alternative group of ineligibles
only. Age is the instrument and the 25th birthday is the cuto® point. Alternative
de¯nitions of ineligibles are used to match the de¯nition of treatment group,
15This is also true for the distribution of each of the underlying covariates.
17depending on the distance in days to the 25th birthday. We then match treated
with ineligibles using standard kernel matching with Epanechnikov weights and
used the matched sample to estimate the additional moment required to compute
the correction term, namely the expected value of non-treated outcomes among
non-treated ineligibles.
4.4 Results
In what follows we discuss the results for the sample of agents °owing into un-
employment within 360 days of their 25th birthday. Results for other tighter age
groups are similar to the ones we present here.
Table 5 describes the number of observations used in estimation. Enrollment
into treatment is much more likely at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
This is in part a consequence of the de¯nition of treatment used in this paper as
being the ¯rst program the individual participates in during the unemployment
spell. However, participation is a relatively rare event and so the number of
participants that move straight into YP from outside unemployment is low. We
therefore choose to discuss the impact of participating in YP within 90 and 180
days of in°ow into unemployment.
Table 5: Sample size by treatment status and de¯nition of treatment; males
completing 25 years of age within 360 days of moving into unemployment
De¯nition of controls
treatment treated eligibles ineligibles
treated within 0 days of in°ow into U 601 27,901 28,934
treated within 30 days of in°ow into U 1,125 27,377 28,934
treated within 90 days of in°ow into U 2,017 26,485 28,934
treated within 180 days of in°ow into U 2,911 25,591 28,934
treated within 360 days of in°ow into U 3,107 25,395 28,934
Table 6 displays the estimates of the ATT on the probability of ¯nding a job
with 12 and 24 months of in°owing into unemployment.
Column 3 on the table presents the standard matching estimates of the im-
pact of YP. The estimated e®ect is small and statistically insigni¯cant in all cases
except for the exits into employment within 24 months of in°ow for those being
treated early in their unemployment spell (within 90 days of becoming unem-
ployed - row 3). In this case, matching suggests that the program improves the
18Table 6: YP: ATT on the out°ows to employment; men aged 24 or 25 at in°ow
into unemployment
Days between becoming Average outcome [ ATT correction [ ATT
unemployed and treated controls (st matching) term (corrected)
enrolling into treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: ¯nding a job within 12 months of becoming unemployed
(1) less than 90 0.332 0.335 -0.002 0.049 -0.052
(0.010) (0.062) (0.063)
(2) less than 180 0.320 0.330 -0.010 0.028 -0.038
(0.010) (0.041) (0.041)
Outcome: ¯nding a job within 24 months of becoming unemployed
(3) less than 90 0.468 0.437 0.030* 0.099** -0.069
(0.013) (0.060) (0.063)
(4) less than 180 0.450 0.436 0.014 0.069 -0.055
(0.010) (0.048) (0.049)
Notes: Estimates for male aged 24 or 25 years old when enrolling into unemployment. Eligibility to YP
depends on age at in°ow: unemployed agents are eligibles (ineligibles) if have not (have) completed 25 years
of age on the day they register as unemployed. \Treatment" means \enrolling into YP as the ¯rst program
during the unemployment spell within some time of becoming unemployed". We have considered alternative
time windows for the duration of unemployment prior to treatment, namely 90 (rows 1 and 3) and 180
days (rows 2 and 4). The impact of treatment is estimated on the probability of ¯nding a job within 12
months (rows 1 and 2) and 24 months (rows 3 and 4) of becoming unemployed. Matching is performed on
the propensity score using Epanechnikov kernel weights with a bandwidth of 0.06. Bootstrapped standard
errors based on 100 replications in brackets below the estimate.
* Statistically di®erent from zero at 5% signi¯cance level.
** Statistically di®erent from zero at 10% signi¯cance level.
odds of ¯nding a job by 3 percent. The correction terms in column 4 are also
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in all but the same case as above, in which
case there is some evidence of it being statistically di®erent from zero. Moreover,
the correction terms are systematically positive and considerably higher in ab-
solute terms than the estimated e®ects. As a consequence, all corrected e®ects
become negative (column 5) although none is statistically di®erent from zero at
conventional signi¯cance levels.
Table 7 shows similar estimates when out°ows into all destination is the out-
come of interest. In this case the standard matching suggest that YP a®ects
negatively the odds of leaving unemployment within 12 months of starting, pos-
sibly detecting some lock-in e®ect (column 3, rows 1 and 2). The treatment
e®ects on the probability of leaving unemployment within 24 months of entering
19Table 7: YP: ATT on the out°ows to all destinations; men aged 24 or 25 at in°ow
into unemployment
Days between becoming Average outcome [ ATT correction [ ATT
unemployed and enrolling treated controls (st matching) term (corrected)
into treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: leaving unemployment within 12 months of becoming unemployed
(1) less than 90 days 0.460 0.512 -0.052* -0.078 0.026
(0.013) (0.062) (0.062)
(2) less than 180 days 0.438 0.511 -0.073* -0.104* 0.031
(0.011) (0.046) (0.048)
Outcome: leaving unemployment within 24 months of becoming unemployed
(3) less than 90 days 0.668 0.645 0.022** -0.070 0.092**
(0.013) (0.053) (0.054)
(4) less than 180 days 0.639 0.646 -0.007 -0.077 0.071
(0.011) (0.053) (0.054)
Notes: Estimates for male aged 24 or 25 years old when enrolling into unemployment. Eligibility to YP
depends on age at in°ow: unemployed agents are eligibles (ineligibles) if have not (have) completed 25 years
of age on the day they register as unemployed. \Treatment" means \enrolling into YP as the ¯rst program
during the unemployment spell within some time of becoming unemployed". We have considered alternative
time windows for the duration of unemployment prior to treatment, namely 90 (rows 1 and 3) and 180 days
(rows 2 and 4). The impact of treatment is estimated on the probability of leaving unemployment within 12
months (rows 1 and 2) and 24 months (rows 3 and 4) of becoming unemployed. Matching is performed on
the propensity score using Epanechnikov kernel weights with a bandwidth of 0.06. Bootstrapped standard
errors based on 100 replications in brackets below the estimate.
* Statistically di®erent from zero at 5% signi¯cance level.
** Statistically di®erent from zero at 10% signi¯cance level.
become positive or zero, which is also consistent with the lock-in interpretation
(column 3, rows 3 and 4). However, the correction term is now always negative
and again larger in absolute terms than the treatment e®ect but generally statis-
tically signi¯cant with one exception (column 4). As a consequence, the corrected
estimates are always positive or zero and apparently increasing with time from
entry into unemployment.
Overall, both tables suggest that matching may not be identifying the correct
parameter although the evidence is not conclusive. Possibly, precise estimates of
corrected e®ects require a higher take-up rate than what is found in the YP (see
¯gure 2 for the distribution of the predicted probability of participation). Since
the denominator of the correction term is the program take-up rate, by being
small it introduces signi¯cant variability in the estimated correction terms and
20corrected treatment e®ects.
5 Discussion of empirical evaluation results
The British NDYP and the Swedish YP have been evaluated before, as well as
a large number of other labor market programs throughout Europe. We brie°y
compare our results to the existing literature.
In the past, youth programs have often shown disappointing results. Heck-
man, LaLonde and Smith (1999) survey a large number of evaluation studies
on US and European programs. Results for the US suggest that labor market
programs may have no impact or even a negative impact on the employment
probability and wages of young people. European interventions seem to have
been more successful in improving the employment prospects and wages of the
treated. The disparity of results may be a consequence of di®erences in program
design and/or population of treated. Labor market programs in Europe tend to
be larger, more generous and to reach a wider, more heterogeneous population
than those in the US. The incidence of unemployment is much lower in the US,
and programs in the US are often speci¯cally designed to focus on the very disad-
vantaged. Conceivably, these may not be as ready to bene¯t from treatment and
may face a stronger stigma from treatment than their European counterparts.
More recently, Kluve (2006)'s survey of the evaluation results in Europe ¯nds
that young men do not seem to bene¯t from these interventions in terms of labor
market outcomes, while young women are found to bene¯t more frequently.
The British NDYP has been the focus of several evaluation studies (e.g. Blun-
dell et al., 2004, De Giorgi, 2005). On a more optimistic note, results have consis-
tently shown signi¯cant positive e®ects of the program on the employment prob-
abilities of young males. All studies compare unemployed completing 6 months in
the claimant count. In one set of estimates, Blundell et al. (2004) explore the age
threshold rule within matching coupled with di®erence-in-di®erences to estimate
the impact of the NDYP on the probability of ¯nding a job within 10 months
of °owing into unemployment. De Giorgi (2005) uses regression discontinuity in
age with a bandwidth close to 180 days to measure the impact of the NDYP
on the probability of employment 18 months after the start on the unemploy-
ment spell. His estimates suggest that the program has improved the chances
of employment among the treated by 5-7%, and are in line with those in Blun-
dell (2004) and our own for a similar bandwidth (row 5 and column 5 in table
2). These results suggest that the mixture of improved job-search assistance and
tougher job-search monitoring used in the NDYP has helped moving and keeping
21young unemployed out of subsidies in the UK. While it is unclear which of the
two mechanisms played the most important role, evidence from other European
countries also hint that such combination may work (Anderson, 2000, Van den
Berg et al., 2004, and Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006, and references
therein). In terms of our comparison between matching and discontinuity design,
the results of the three studies taken together further support the claim that the
careful use of matching in the evaluation of the NDYP has identi¯ed the true
ATT treatment e®ect parameter.
Swedish subsidized work programs have also been the focus of several studies.
Sianesi (2004) carefully analyzes the overall impact of the Swedish ALMP system
and the di®erential impact of each of the numerous available treatments for adults
(so this excludes YP). She ¯nds that subsidized employment is the best performer
in terms of moving unemployed back into work, and that the positive e®ect of
subsidized employment seems to last. All other programs have either a zero or a
negative impact, possibly arising through the renewed eligibility to bene¯ts as a
consequence of program participation. The pivotal YP evaluation is in Larsson
(2003). In contrast to Sianesi's results for adults, Larsson ¯nds strong negative
e®ects of this program on the probability of leaving unemployment within 12
months of treatment, that then fade to zero after 24 months. These results are
more pessimistic than our own although not completely incompatible. Possibly
explaining the di®erences is the fact that Larsson constructs a comparison group
conditional on not being treated for the whole duration of the treatment spell.
But, to put it extreme, this e®ectively amounts to conditioning on a successful
outcome, especially in the Swedish system where the decision is between partici-
pating now against waiting a little longer while trying to ¯nd a job. As has been
widely reported in studies of the Swedish system (see e.g. Larsson, 2003), those
who stay unemployed long enough will eventually participate in one of the many
treatments available. If an unemployed individual is observed not to participate
in a treatment, then this may be to some extent because they manage to leave
unemployment before participation.
Our results suggest that YP has no impact on employment outcomes but may,
in the longer run (after 24 months) lead to (probably temporary) exit from unem-
ployment for other reasons. For example, individuals may move into education or
take further treatment (possibly cycling between open unemployment and treat-
ment to take advantage of the possibility to renew eligibility to unemployment
bene¯ts through treatment participation).
226 Conclusion
We have developed and applied an evaluation method for the e®ects of program
participation (or policy exposure) on individual outcomes, if participation is se-
lective but individuals are ineligible in case of a certain value of some observed
(instrumental) variable. From a practical point of view this is a common setting,
in particular for active labor market policies for young individuals. In those cases,
participation may be selective because individuals can choose between di®erent
programs and/or because the duration until enrollment is not deterministically
set. Program participation is only possible if the individual is aged below a cer-
tain age. With selective participation, if the CIA is violated, matching cannot be
used. For the same reason, one cannot simply compare those below the threshold
who are treated to those above the threshold (who are all non-treated). How-
ever, our novel method, which exploits the eligibility boundary restriction within
the matching framework, provides consistent estimates of the average treatment
e®ect on those who are treated.
The application to the Swedish Youth Practice program shows that our method
can deliver evaluation results that di®er from those based on standard matching
methods. The matching estimates for the e®ect on re-employment are sometimes
signi¯cantly positive, whereas the estimates based on our method are always in-
signi¯cant. The di®erence between the estimates is sometimes signi¯cant. The
re-employment e®ects are invariably estimated to be smaller than those based on
matching, whereas for the e®ects on the over-all exit probabilities out of unem-
ployment the reverse holds. As a result, we are less optimistic about the e®ect
of subsidized work on the rate of ¯nding work than if we had incorrectly based
ourselves on the matching estimates, and we are more optimistic concerning the
transition rate to other destinations. From a policy point of view, our results
suggest that perhaps an optimism about the use of subsidized work programs to
bring unemployed youth back to work should be tempered.
An additional contribution of the paper concerns the performance of the
matching method in the case of a sharp eligibility-discontinuity design. Speci¯-
cally, we examine this for the New Deal for Young People program for unemployed
youth aged below 25. It turns out that matching is able to capture the assign-
ment mechanism, in the sense that the estimates based on matching are not
signi¯cantly di®erent from those obtained with regression-discontinuity methods.
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26Appendix: Propensity score estimates
Table 8 shows the estimates of the propensity score for the NDYP application.
We tested the joint signi¯cance of the groups of variables. Only marital status
and quarter of entrance are statistically signi¯cant. Table 9 displays the estimates
of the propensity score for the YP application. Alternative speci¯cations have
been tried but do not change the nature of the results in both cases.
Table 8: NDYP (part 1)
covariates coe±cient st. error
constant 0.382 0.271
Marital status: married -0.004 0.075
Marital status: divorced/widow -0.397 0.125
Marital status: unknown -0.050 0.097
U spells past year: none -0.169 0.222
U spells past year: 1 -0.154 0.204
U spells past year: 2 -0.097 0.195
U spells past year: 3 -0.116 0.197
U spells past 2 years: none 0.089 0.212
U spells past 2 years: 1 0.211 0.177
U spells past 2 years: 2 0.248 0.154
U spells past 2 years: 3 0.100 0.131
U spells past 3 years: none 0.060 0.168
U spells past 3 years: 1 -0.018 0.137
U spells past 3 years: 2 -0.004 0.119
U spells past 3 years: 3 -0.042 0.104
% time in U past year -0.111 0.186
% time in U past 2 years -0.265 0.321
% time in U past 3 years 0.309 0.266
In°ow in U: 97:IV -0.257 0.203
In°ow in U: 98:I -0.476 0.206
In°ow in U: 98:II -0.364 0.207
In°ow in U: 98:III -0.402 0.207
In°ow in U: 98:IV -0.437 0.209
(table continues next page)
27Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
covariates coe±cient st. error
In°ow in U: 99:I -0.622 0.209
In°ow in U: 99:II -0.433 0.215
In°ow in U: 99:III -0.317 0.213
In°ow in U: 99:IV -0.396 0.219
In°ow in U: 00:I -0.441 0.218
In°ow in U: 00:II -0.572 0.235
In°ow in U: 00:III -0.431 0.222
In°ow in U: 00:IV -0.501 0.225
In°ow in U: 01:I -0.289 0.235
In°ow in U: 01:II -0.408 0.240
In°ow in U: 01:III -0.174 0.243
In°ow in U: 01:IV 0.082 0.247
In°ow in U: 02:I -0.036 0.244
In°ow in U: 02:II -0.268 0.253
In°ow in U: 02:III -0.226 0.238
In°ow in U: 02:IV 0.052 0.248
In°ow in U: 03:I -0.214 0.239
In°ow in U: 03:II -0.099 0.260
In°ow in U: 03:III -0.166 0.249
In°ow in U: 03:IV -0.280 0.246
Region 2 0.039 0.105
Region 3 0.088 0.108
Region 4 0.003 0.114
Region 5 -0.125 0.209
Region 6 0.108 0.211
Region 7 0.216 0.157
Region 8 0.311 0.239
(table continues next page)
28Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
covariates coe±cient st. error
Region 9 0.007 0.166
Region 10 -0.005 0.320
Region 11 0.074 0.117
Region 12 0.098 0.117
Region 13 0.169 0.212
Region 14 0.135 0.222
Region 15 0.038 0.141
Region 16 0.049 0.189
Region 17 0.067 0.195
Region 18 0.806 0.487
Region 19 0.123 0.118
Region 20 0.031 0.107
Region 21 0.247 0.135
Region 22 0.202 0.102
Region 23 0.131 0.171
Region 24 0.646 0.547
Region 26 -0.062 0.217
Region 27 0.270 0.280
Region 28 -0.401 0.337
Region 29 -0.054 0.123
Region 30 0.024 0.244
Region 31 -0.031 0.223
Region 32 0.088 0.135
Region 33 0.088 0.122
Region 34 -0.073 0.155
Region 35 -0.004 0.221
Region 36 0.0587 0.136
(table continues next page)
29Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
covariates coe±cient st. error
Usual occupation 2 0.288 0.876
Usual occupation 3 -0.226 0.284
Usual occupation 4 0.640 0.296
Usual occupation 5 -0.076 0.522
Usual occupation 6 0.051 0.627
Usual occupation 8 0.728 0.696
Usual occupation 9 0.277 0.300
Usual occupation 10 0.392 0.527
Usual occupation 11 0.243 0.366
Usual occupation 12 -0.261 0.230
Usual occupation 14 -0.409 0.262
Usual occupation 15 -0.281 0.364
Usual occupation 17 -0.087 0.640
Usual occupation 18 -0.086 0.902
Usual occupation 19 -0.585 0.740
Usual occupation 20 -0.492 0.345
Usual occupation 21 -0.665 0.322
Usual occupation 22 -0.180 0.274
Usual occupation 24 -0.248 0.221
Usual occupation 25 -0.268 0.318
Usual occupation 26 -0.081 0.889
Usual occupation 27 -0.119 0.930
Usual occupation 28 0.032 0.151
Usual occupation 29 -0.256 0.631
Usual occupation 30 -0.683 0.512
Usual occupation 31 -0.245 0.159
Usual occupation 32 -0.146 0.278
(table continues next page)
30Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
covariates coe±cient st. error
Usual occupation 33 0.021 0.120
Usual occupation 34 0.128 0.124
Usual occupation 35 0.017 0.532
Usual occupation 36 -0.446 0.439
Usual occupation 37 -0.024 0.367
Usual occupation 38 -0.060 0.172
Usual occupation 39 -0.384 0.255
Usual occupation 40 -0.103 0.186
Usual occupation 41 0.364 0.212
Usual occupation 42 0.175 0.193
Usual occupation 43 0.032 0.370
Usual occupation 44 -0.136 0.486
Usual occupation 45 0.204 0.245
Usual occupation 47 -0.234 0.245
Usual occupation 48 -0.008 0.640
Usual occupation 49 0.153 0.193
Usual occupation 50 -0.212 0.143
Usual occupation 52 -0.467 0.232
Usual occupation 53 0.306 0.296
Usual occupation 54 0.094 0.359
Usual occupation 55 0.476 0.755
Usual occupation 57 -0.046 0.893
Usual occupation 58 -0.039 0.158
Usual occupation 59 0.033 0.102
(table continues next page)
31Table 8: NDYP (cont.)
covariates coe±cient st. error
Usual occupation 60 -0.540 0.784
Usual occupation 61 -0.097 0.443
Usual occupation 62 0.304 0.401
Usual occupation 63 -0.614 0.228
Usual occupation 64 -0.419 0.252
Usual occupation 66 -0.897 0.476
Usual occupation 67 -0.243 0.248
Usual occupation 68 -0.082 0.179
Usual occupation 69 -0.325 0.163
Usual occupation 70 -0.189 0.328
Usual occupation 71 0.023 0.280
Usual occupation 72 -0.184 0.325
Usual occupation 73 -0.179 0.084
Usual occupation 74 -0.276 0.118
Usual occupation 75 0.177 0.349
Usual occupation 76 -0.339 0.747
Usual occupation 77 0.018 0.181
32Table 9: YP (part 1)
covariates coe±cient st. error
constant -1.455(*) .042
Region 3 -.198(*) .062
Region 4 -.069 .056
Region 5 .133(*) .044
Region 6 .023 .053
Region 7 .157(*) .063
Region 8 .161(*) .054
Region 9 -.310(*) .143
Region 10 .285(*) .063
Region 11 -.037 .033
Region 12 .162(*) .055
Region 13 .079(*) .029
Region 14 .165(*) .048
Region 15 .048 .054
Region 16 .169(*) .051
Region 17 .202(*) .048
Region 18 -.018 .053
Region 19 .086 .053
Region 20 .035 .067
Region 21 -.181(*) .056
Highest educational achievement
secondary level .078(*) .037
vocational education .056(*) .024
university .037 .034
(table continues next page)
33Table 9: YP (cont.)
covariates coe±cient st. error
Unemployment history (**)
% time in U over last year .258(*) .081
% time in U over last 2 years .170 .106
% time in T over last year .175 .104
% time in T over last 2 years .156 .117
% time in YP over last year .772(*) .188
% time in YP over last 2 years .267 .271
% time in E over last year -.444(*) .216
% time in E over last 2 years .098 .336
Quarter of in°ow into unemployment
quarter II -.205(*) .031
quarter III -.093(*) .030
quarter IV -.110(*) .032




Notes: Estimates from a probit regression of the participation
dummy variable on all observables except age using 57431 obser-
vations in total.
(*) Statistically di®erent from zero at the conventional 5% signi¯-
cance level.
(**) U stands for unemployment, T stands for treatment other then
YP, YP stands for Youth Practice and E stands for employment.
Individuals may have had previous YP spells from open unemploy-
ment spells in July 1st, 1992.
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